Device keys that never travel
When a rider registers, it and the cloud agree on a key using ML-KEM-768, a post-quantum key exchange standardised as FIPS 203. The key itself is never sent over the network, and the cloud stores its copy encrypted.
A cargo passes through strangers' phones, so it has to be protected from the moment it's created. Here's how, in plain language.
When a rider registers, it and the cloud agree on a key using ML-KEM-768, a post-quantum key exchange standardised as FIPS 203. The key itself is never sent over the network, and the cloud stores its copy encrypted.
Every cargo is encrypted on the device with AES-256-GCM, strong enough to stay safe against future quantum computers. Drivers carry it but can't read it or change it unnoticed.
A consumer can publish a public key. Riders that have it seal the message with HPKE (X25519, AES-256-GCM) before the outer encryption, so only that consumer can open it, not Thummer.
To be clear: this inner layer uses classical X25519, not a post-quantum algorithm, because post-quantum ciphertexts don't fit in a Bluetooth-sized cargo. The post-quantum outer layer still protects every cargo.
Drivers and apps reach the cloud over TLS 1.3, preferring the hybrid post-quantum key exchange X25519MLKEM768. Even over an older connection, the cargo inside is already encrypted end to end.
Delivery receipts are signed with HMAC-SHA256 under a key only the rider and the cloud share. Drivers can carry receipts back but can't fake one.
Every rider, driver, consumer and account is authenticated. Message size and frequency are limited by account class, duplicates are recognised, and sign-in and sign-up attempts are rate limited.
Passwords are stored as bcrypt hashes, and API keys as hashes or encrypted copies. Signing in is rate limited, and administrators can require a password change.
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